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Abstract
This paper proves the tight sample complexity of Second-Price Auction with Anonymous
Reserve, up to a logarithmic factor, for all value distribution families that have been consid-
ered in the literature. Compared to Myerson Auction, whose sample complexity was settled
very recently in (Guo, Huang and Zhang, STOC 2019), Anonymous Reserve requires much
fewer samples for learning. We follow a similar framework as the Guo-Huang-Zhang work,
but replace their information theoretical argument with a direct proof.
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1 Introduction
Bayesian auction theory assumes the seller to know the prior value information of bidders,
and design auctions/mechanisms by leveraging that information. In the real-life applications,
the priors are learned from historical data. How much data is needed to learn good auctions?
This motivates the research interest in the sample complexity for auction design, initiated by
Cole and Roughgarden (2014).1 More concretely, it probes into how many samples are re-
quired, with respect to the precision ε ∈ (0, 1) and the bidder population n ∈ N≥1, to learn an
(1−ε)-approximately optimal auction. There is a long line of works improving the sample com-
plexity (Cole and Roughgarden, 2014; Morgenstern and Roughgarden, 2015; Devanur et al.,
2016; Gonczarowski and Nisan, 2017; Syrgkanis, 2017; Huang et al., 2018). The recent break-
through result by Guo et al. (2019) derived the tight sample complexity, up to poly-logarithmic
factors, for all value distribution families that have been concerned in the literature.
The above results all target the revenue-optimal single-item auction, namely the canoni-
cal Myerson Auction (Myerson, 1981). However, Myerson Auction is fairly complicated and
is rarely used in the real life (cf. Ausubel and Milgrom, 2006). In contrast, the AGT commu-
nity has placed “simplicity” as a basic goal for auction design (cf. Hartline and Roughgarden,
2009; Chawla et al., 2010; Babaioff et al., 2014; Alaei et al., 2015; Cai and Zhao, 2017;
Rubinstein and Weinberg, 2018). In practice, one of the most popular auctions is Second-
Price Auction with Anonymous Reserve (namely the same reserve price for every bidder), e.g.
the auctions in eBay, AdX and Adsense. We emphasize that such an auction has truly simple
instructions:
Based on the bidders’ value distributions, the seller selects a careful reserve r ∈ R≥0 for
the single item. If all the bids are below r, then the seller retains the item. If only the
highest bid reaches r, then the highest bidder wins the item by paying this reserve price.
Otherwise (i.e. two or more bids reach r), the highest bidder wins the item by paying a
price of the second-highest bid.
The significance and practicality of Anonymous Reserve auction naturally motivate a rich liter-
ature to study its learnability (Cesa-Bianchi et al., 2015; Morgenstern and Roughgarden, 2015;
Mohri and Medina, 2016; Roughgarden and Schrijvers, 2016; Liu et al., 2018) and approxima-
bility against Myerson Auction in terms of revenue (Hartline and Roughgarden, 2009; Hartline,
2013; Alaei et al., 2015; Jin et al., 2019b,a).
The first “approximability” result was attained in Myerson’s original paper (Myerson, 1981):
if the value distributions are i.i.d. and meet the standard regularity assumption (see Section 2.1
for its definition), Myerson Auction reduces to Anonymous Reserve auction. Even if the distri-
butional assumptions are greatly relaxed, as we quote from Hartline and Roughgarden (2009):
“in quite general settings, simple auctions like Anonymous Reserve auction provably approxi-
mates the optimal expected revenue, to within a small constant factor.” Moreover, the learnability
has been tackled in various contexts. For example, Cesa-Bianchi et al. (2015) assumed i.i.d. and
[0, 1]-support value distributions, and got a nearly optimal sample complexity of Θ˜(ε−2).2
Despite above discussions, how many samples suffice to learn an (1 − ε)-approximately
optimal reserve price, when the bidders may have distinct value distributions? This problem is
important to understand the Anonymous Reserve auction but has yet to be settled. Because
1A very related topic, the sample complexity of optimal pricing for a single bidder, dates back to
(Dhangwatnotai et al., 2010). Also, some regret-minimization variants date earlier to (Bar-Yossef et al., 2002;
Blum et al., 2003; Blum and Hartline, 2005).
2Precisely, Cesa-Bianchi et al. studied the slightly different problem of regret minimization over a time horizon
t ∈ T (in terms of the cumulative revenue loss against the optimal Anonymous Reserve auction). While a strong
distributional assumption is imposed, the seller is assumed to know just the allocations and payments in the past
rounds. Cesa-Bianchi et al. obtained a nearly optimal Θ˜(
√
T)-regret algorithm. This regret bound easily indicates
the Θ˜(ε−2) sample complexity bound.
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Setting [0, 1]-additive [1, H] Regular MHR
Myerson Auction Θ˜(n · ε−2) Θ˜(n ·H · ε−2) Θ˜(n · ε−3) Θ˜(n · ε−2)
Cole and Roughgarden (2014); Morgenstern and Roughgarden (2015); Devanur et al. (2016)
Gonczarowski and Nisan (2017); Syrgkanis (2017); Huang et al. (2018); Guo et al. (2019)
Anonymous Reserve Θ˜(ε−2) Θ˜(H · ε−2) Θ˜(ε−3) Θ˜(ε−2)
Theorem 1, cf. Cesa-Bianchi et al. (2015); Morgenstern and Roughgarden (2015)
Mohri and Medina (2016); Roughgarden and Schrijvers (2016)
Table 1: Comparison between the sample complexity of Myerson Auction and that of Anony-
mous Reserve. In the MHR setting, the matching lower bounds of Ω(n · ε−2) and Ω(ε−2)
are known for the discrete MHR distributions (Guo et al., 2019, Section 4 and Appendix D.1).
If we insist on the continuous MHR distributions, the best known lower bounds are Ω(n ·
ε−3/2) (Guo et al., 2019, Appendix E) and Ω(ε−3/2) (Huang et al., 2018, Section 4).
we only need to learn a good reserve price, conceivably the task should be much easier than
learning Myerson Auction, which requires full understanding of all bidders’ distributions. Our
work shows that this is exactly the case: as Table 1 illustrates, Anonymous Reserve auction
in comparison has dramatically smaller sample complexity. Remarkably, it depends only on the
precision ε ∈ (0, 1) but not on the population n ∈ N≥1.
In fact, our learning algorithm for the Anonymous Reserve auction is very simple and
intuitive, and thus may be more attractive in practice. First, we slightly “shrink” (in the sense
of stochastic dominance) the empirical distributions determined by the samples, leading to
the dominated empirical distributions. Then, we compute the optimal reserve price for these
dominated empirical distributions (or anyone of optimal reserve prices when there are multiple
ones). Employing this reserve price turns out to generate an (1 − ε)-fraction as much revenue
as the optimal Anonymous Reserve auction.
This framework was proposed by Guo et al. (2019) and the analysis contains two parts:
revenue monotonicity and revenue smoothness. The revenue monotonicity of a certain auction
means, if a distribution instance F stochastically dominates another F ′, then the respective rev-
enues satisfy REV(F) ≥ REV(F ′). Since Myerson Auction and the Anonymous Reserve auction
both have this feature, for the analysis about revenue monotonicity we can apply arguments
a` la Guo et al. Further, the revenue smoothness means that if two distribution instances are
stochastically close (in some metric), then the revenues from them must be close as well. Guo
et al. establish the revenue smoothness of Myerson Auction via an elegant information theoret-
ical argument. However, this proof scheme is inapplicable here, and instead we will present a
more direct proof.
Before elaborating on the new argument, let us briefly explain why the Anonymous Reserve
auction needs much fewer samples. The outcome of such an auction (namely the allocation and
the payment) is controlled by the highest and second-highest bids. Accordingly, the optimal
reserve price can be derived just from the distributions of these two bids. (In contrast, we must
know the distributions of all bidders, in order to implement Myerson Auction.) Since only two
distributions rather than n distributions are involved, we can eliminate the dependence of the
sample complexity on the population.
Nonetheless, the restriction on the highest and second-highest bids incurs another issue. In
the model, we assume the bids to be mutually independent. This assumption is critical both for
the information theoretical argument by Guo et al. and for the optimality of Myerson Auction.
On the opposite, the highest two bids in general are correlated. It is highly non-trivial whether
we can extend the information theoretical argument to accommodate the correlated distribu-
tions.3 Thus, we prove the revenue smoothness by working with the Anonymous Reserve rev-
3The information theoretical argument by Guo et al. (2019) crucially relies on a particular form of Pinsker’s
3
enue directly. The techniques derived here may find extra applications in the future (e.g. they
complement the extreme value theorems of Cole and Roughgarden, 2014; Cai and Daskalakis,
2015; Morgenstern and Roughgarden, 2015). We believe that a similar approach (associated
with the tools by Jin et al., 2019a) can circumvent the information theoretical argument by
Guo et al. (2019) and refine the poly-logarithmic factors in their sample complexity of Myerson
Auction.
Correlation. Another benefit of the direct argument is that, even if all the n bids are arbi-
trarily correlated (but capped with a certain high value), learning the Anonymous Reserve
auction requires exactly the same amount of samples. This generalized model is arguably much
more realistic. An intriguing open problem in this direction is to study, with respect to the
correlated distributions, the sample complexity of the optimal mechanisms (Dobzinski et al.,
2015; Papadimitriou and Pierrakos, 2015) or the optima in certain families of robust mecha-
nisms (Ronen, 2001; Chen et al., 2011; Bei et al., 2019).
Data Compression. If we care about the space complexity of the learning algorithms, the im-
provement on the Anonymous Reserve auction against Myerson Auction is even larger. To
learn Myerson Auction, we need O˜(n2) · poly(1/ε) space both to implement the algorithm and
to store the output auction. (Note that each sample is an n-dimensional value vector.) Namely,
we cannot predict the bids coming in the future, and must record all details of the learned
“virtual value functions”. But for the Anonymous Reserve auction, in that only the highest and
second-highest bids are involved, we just need poly(1/ε) space to implement the algorithm and
O(1) space to store the learned reserve price. This property is rather important to large markets,
where historical data cannot be stored entirely in the memory and we wish to handle it in very
few passes (in the sense of streaming algorithms).
1.1 Comparison with Previous Approaches
To understand the sample complexity of Anonymous Reserve auction, an immediate attempt
is to readopt the algorithm of Cesa-Bianchi et al. (2015), under minor modification to accom-
modate non-identical and even correlated value distributions (rather than just the i.i.d. ones).
However, that algorithm crucially relies on a particular property of i.i.d. value distributions: we
can infer F1 point-wise from F2 and vice versa, where Fi denotes the CDF of the i-th highest
bid. Without the i.i.d. assumption, the correlation between F1 and F2 is much more complex,
which makes this attempt fail to work for our purpose.
Also, one may attempt the empirical revenue maximization scheme, which gives the nearly
tight sample complexity for the similar task “optimal pricing for a single bidder”. Unfortunately,
in the regular and the MHR settings, the proofs of that sample complexity crucially rely on the
respective regularity/MHR assumption (Dhangwatnotai et al., 2010; Huang et al., 2018). In
contrast, given n ∈ N≥1 many regular/MHR value distributions, F1 and F2 may be Θ(n)-modal
(see Jin et al., 2019b, Example 2). So, F1 and F2 themselves cannot be regular/MHR (recall
that a regular/MHR distribution must be unimodal). To conclude, this attempt fails to work as
well.
Another approach in the literature is to construct an ε-net of all candidate reserve prices,
namely a careful poly(1/ε)-size hypothesis set H, and figure out the best one in H through the
samples (cf. Devanur et al., 2016; Roughgarden and Schrijvers, 2016; Gonczarowski and Nisan,
2017, which use this method to learn Myerson Auction). In fact, for the [0, 1]-support and the
[1, H]-support settings, it is a folklore that ε-net type algorithms can achieve the almost tight
sample complexity. But the regular and the MHR cases are less understood, mainly due to
inequality, which holds only for independent distributions. In contrast, for Anonymous Reserve auction we need
to deal with the generally correlated highest and second-highest distributions. So, we have to abandon the proof
scheme by Guo et al. and reason about the Anonymous Reserve revenues directly.
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the lack of suitable tools such as some particular extreme value theorems. This is settled here;
given the developed techniques, we can present such sample-optimal ε-net type algorithms in
both settings.
However, we prefer the “shrink-then-optimize” framework of Guo et al. (2019) for two rea-
sons. First, ε-net type algorithms choose distinct hypothesis sets H for different value distribu-
tion families, i.e. the distributional assumption somehow is part of the “input”. By contrast, the
new framework gives a unified and robust learning algorithm. Particularly, the distributional
assumption is just to derive meaningful sample complexity, but is irrelevant to the algorithm
itself. Second, our paper illustrates that the new framework works not only for the input value
distributions as in (Guo et al., 2019) but also for some “sketched” distributions, namely order
statistics for our purpose. It would be interesting to see further extensions of this framework.
1.2 Other Related Work
As mentioned, after being proposed in the pioneering work of Cole and Roughgarden (2014),
the sample complexity of Myerson Auction had been improved in a sequence of pa-
pers (Morgenstern and Roughgarden, 2015; Devanur et al., 2016; Roughgarden and Schrijvers,
2016; Gonczarowski and Nisan, 2017; Syrgkanis, 2017) and was eventually resolved by
Guo et al. (2019). En route, a number of techniques have been developed, which may find
their applications in mechanism design, learning theory and information theory. For an outline
of these techniques, the reader can turn to Guo et al. (2019, Section 1).
A very related topic is the sample complexity of single-bidder revenue maximization. Now,
the optimal mechanism is to post the monopoly price p
def
= argmax
{
v · (1 − F(v)) | v ∈ R≥0}
and then let the bidder make a take-it-or-leave-it decision. Again, the problem is self-contained
only under one of the four assumptions in Table 1. Up to a poly-logarithmic factor, the optimal
sample complexity is Θ˜(ε−2) in the [0, 1]-support additive-error setting (Balcan et al., 2008;
Huang et al., 2018), Θ˜(H · ε−2) in the [1, H]-support setting (Balcan et al., 2008; Huang et al.,
2018), Θ˜(ε−3) in the continuous regular setting (Dhangwatnotai et al., 2010; Huang et al.,
2018), and Θ˜(ε−2) in the MHR setting (Guo et al., 2019).
One can easily see that,4 in each of the four settings, the sample complexity of the Anony-
mous Reserve auction must be lower bounded by the single-bidder sample complexity. In that
each mentioned single-bidder lower bound matches with the claimed sample complexity of the
Anonymous Reserve auction in Table 1 (up to a logarithmic factor), it remains to establish the
upper bounds in the bulk of this work.
To learn good posted prices for a single buyer, a complementary direction is to investigate
how much expected revenue can be achieved via exactly one sample. When the distribution is
regular, Dhangwatnotai et al. (2010) showed that using the sampled value itself as the price
guarantees half of the optimal revenue. Indeed, this ratio is the best possible (in the worst-case-
analysis sense), when the seller must post a deterministic price. But, better ratios are possible
under certain adjustments to the model. First, if the seller can observe one more sample, he can
improve the ratio to 0.509 (Babaioff et al., 2018).5 Second, if a randomized price is allowed, the
seller can get a better revenue guarantee by constructing a careful distribution of the price from
the single sample (Fu et al., 2015). Recently, Allouah and Besbes (2019) improved this ratio
to 0.501, and proved no randomized pricing scheme can achieve a 0.511-approximation. Fur-
ther, if the buyer’s distribution satisfies the stronger MHR condition, Huang et al. (2018) gave a
deterministic 0.589-approximation one-sample pricing scheme. Afterwards, Allouah and Besbes
(2019) improved this ratio to 0.635, and obtained a 0.648 impossibility result for any determin-
4For example, imagine there is a dominant bidder in revenue maximization, and the other (n − 1) bidders are
negligible.
5Concretely, Babaioff et al. (2018) employs the empirical revenue maximization pricing scheme. That is, let
s1 ≥ s2 be the two samples, then choose s1 as the posted price when s1 ≥ 2 · s2 and choose s2 otherwise.
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istic/randomized pricing scheme.
Another motivation of the “mechanism design via sampling” program is the recent re-
search interest in multi-item mechanism design, where Myerson Auction or its naive gener-
alizations are no longer optimal. In fact, the optimal multi-item mechanisms are often com-
putationally and conceptually hard (Daskalakis et al., 2014; Chen et al., 2015, 2018a,b). To
escape from this dilemma, there is a rich literature on proving that various simple multi-
item mechanisms are learnable from polynomial samples and constantly approximate the
optima (Morgenstern and Roughgarden, 2015; Balcan et al., 2016; Daskalakis and Syrgkanis,
2016; Morgenstern and Roughgarden, 2016; Cai and Daskalakis, 2017; Syrgkanis, 2017;
Balcan et al., 2018).
Organization. Notation and preliminaries are given below. In Section 3, we show our learning
algorithm (see Algorithm 1) and present the analysis about revenue monotonicity. In Section 4,
we present the analysis about revenue smoothness, hence the sample complexity promised in
Table 1. In Section 5, we conclude this paper with a discussion on future research directions.
2 Notation and Preliminaries
Notation. Denote by R≥0 (resp. N≥1) the set of all non-negative real numbers (resp. positive
integers). For any pair of integers b ≥ a ≥ 0, denote by [a] the set {1, 2, · · · , a}, and by [a : b]
the set {a, a + 1, · · · , b}. Denote by 1{·} the indicator function. The function (·)+ maps any
real number z ∈ R to max{0, z}. For convenience, we interchange bid/value and bidder/buyer.
2.1 Probability
Throughout the paper, we use the calligraphic letter F to denote the input instance (i.e. an
n-dimensional joint distribution), from which the n buyers together sample/draw a random
value vector s ≡ (sj)j∈[n] ∈ Rn≥0. Particularly, if the value sj ’s are independent random variables
(sampled/drawn from a product distribution F), we further write F ≡ {Fj}nj=1, where each Fj
presents the the marginal value distribution of the individual buyer j ∈ [n].
Actually, with respect to the Anonymous Reserve auctions (to be elaborated in Section 2.2),
the highest and second-highest values ŝ1 and ŝ2 are of particular interest. We respectively denote
by F1 and F2 the distributions of ŝ1 and ŝ2.
As usual in literature, we also use the notations F and Fi (for i ∈ {1, 2}) and Fj (for j ∈ [n])
to denote the corresponding CDF’s. However, we assume that a single-dimensional CDF Fi or
Fj is left-continuous,
6 in the sense that if a buyer has a random value s ∼ F for a price-p item,
then his unwilling-to-purchase probability is Pr{s < p} rather than Pr{s ≤ p}. Additionally,
we say that a distribution F stochastically dominates another distribution F′ (or simply F  F′)
when their CDF’s have F(v) ≤ F′(v) for any value v ∈ R≥0.
We will probe the input instance F in four canonical settings. The first and second settings,
where the support supp(F) is bounded within the n-dimensional hypercube [0, 1]n or [1, H]n
(for a given real number H ≥ 1), are clear.
The third setting requires the input instance F ≡ {Fj}nj=1 to be a product distribution, and
each Fj to be a continuous regular distribution.
7 Denote by fj the corresponding PDF. According
to Myerson (1981), the regularity means that the virtual value function ϕj(v)
def
= v − 1−Fj(v)fj(v) is
non-decreasing on the support of supp(Fj).
In the last setting, the input instance F ≡ {Fj}nj=1 also must be a product distribution, but
each Fj now may be a discrete or continuous (or even mixture) distribution that has a monotone
6For the n-dimensional input distribution F , we never work with its CDF directly.
7More precisely, Fj can have a unique probability mass at its support supremum.
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hazard rate (MHR). Let us specify the MHR condition (cf. Barlow et al., 1963) in the next
paragraph.
MHR Distribution. Any discrete MHR instance F ≡ {Fj}nj=1 must be supported on a discrete
set {k ·∆ | k ∈ N≥1} (as Figure 1(a) demonstrates), where ∆ > 0 is a given step-size. For each
j ∈ [n], consider the step function Gj(v) def= ln
(
1− Fj(v)
)
(marked in blue) as well as the piece-
wise linear function Lj (marked in gray) determined by the origin (0, 0) and the “q”-type points(
k·∆, Gj(k·∆)
)
’s (marked in green). The MHR condition holds iff each Lj is a concave function.
Moreover, for a continuous MHR instance F ≡ {Fj}nj=1, each individual Fj is supported on a
possibly distinct interval. The MHR condition holds iff each Gj(v)
def
= ln
(
1−Fj(v)
)
is a concave
function on its own support, as Figure 1(b) illustrates.
y
v0
Gj(v) = ln
(
1− Fj(v)
)
(a) Discrete MHR distribution
y
v0
Gj(v) = ln
(
1− Fj(v)
)
(b) Continuous MHR distribution
Figure 1: Demonstration for discrete and continuous MHR distributions.
2.2 Anonymous Reserve
In a Second-Price Auction with Anonymous Reserve, the seller posts an a priori reserve r ∈ R≥0
to the item. There are three possible outcomes: (i) when no buyer has a value of at least the
reserve r, the auction would abort; (ii) when there is exactly one such buyer, he would pay the
reserve r for winning the item; (iii) when there are two or more such buyers, the highest-value
buyer (with arbitrary tie-breaking rule) would pay the second-highest value (i.e. a price of at
least the reserve r) for winning the item.
We now formulate the expected revenue from the above mechanism (see Cesa-Bianchi et al.,
2015, Fact 1). Sample a random value vector s ≡ (sj)j∈[n] ∼ F and then denote by (̂s1, ŝ2) the
highest and second-highest values. By simulating the mechanism, we have
(outcome revenue) = r · 1{̂s1 ≥ r > ŝ2}+ ŝ2 · 1{̂s2 ≥ r}
= r · 1{̂s1 ≥ r}+ (̂s2 − r)+
⇒ (expected revenue) = r ·Pr{̂s1 ≥ r}+E{(̂s2 − r)+}.
In order to comprehend the expected revenue (denoted by AR(r, F) for brevity), we need to
know nothing (e.g. the correlation between ŝ1 and ŝ2) but the marginal CDF’s F1 and F2. So, we
may write F ≡ F1 ⊎F2, namely the “union” of the highest and second-highest CDF’s. Equipped
with the new notations, let us formulate the expected revenue more explicitly.
Fact 1 (Revenue Formula (Cesa-Bianchi et al., 2015)). Under any reserve r ∈ R≥0, the corre-
sponding Anonymous Reserve auction extracts an expected revenue of
AR(r, F) = r · (1−F1(r)) + ∫ ∞r (1−F2(x)) · dx.
When the reserve r ∈ R≥0 is selected optimally, namely rF def= argmax{AR(r, F) | r ∈ R≥0}
(which might be infinity), we simply write AR(F) ≡ AR(rF , F). Based on the revenue formula
in Fact 1, one can easily check the next Fact 2 via elementary calculations.
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Fact 2. The following holds for any pair of instances F ≡ F1⊎F2 and F ′ ≡ F ′1⊎F ′2 that admits
the stochastic dominance F1  F ′1 and F2  F ′2:
1. AR(r, F) ≥ AR(r, F ′) for any reserve r ∈ R≥0.
2. AR(F) ≥ AR(F ′).
For ease of presentation, we also need the extra notations below, and the next Fact 3 (see
Appendix A.1 for its proof) will often be invoked in our later proof.
• The parameter β def= ln(8m/δ)m , in which m ∈ N≥1 represents the sample complexity and
δ ∈ (0, 1) denotes the failing probability of a learning algorithm.
• The empirical instance E ≡ E1 ⊎ E2 is given by a number of m ∈ N≥1 samples. Consider
the i-th highest entry of every sample, then the i-th highest empirical distribution Ei is
exactly the uniform distribution supported on these i-th highest entries. Equivalently, Ei is
the uniform distribution induced by m samples from the i-th highest input distribution Fi.
• The shaded instance F˜ ≡ F˜1 ⊎ F˜2: every i-th highest shaded CDF F˜i is defined as F˜i(v) def=
SF (Fi(v)) for all value v ∈ R≥0, where the function
SF (x)
def
= min
{
1, x+
√
8β · x · (1− x) + 7β}, ∀x ∈ [0, 1].
• The shaded empirical instance E˜ ≡ E˜1 ⊎ E˜2: every i-th highest shaded empirical CDF E˜i is
defined as E˜i(v) def= SE(Ei(v)) for all value v ∈ R≥0, where the function
SE(x)
def
= min
{
1, x+
√
2β · x · (1− x) + 4β}, ∀x ∈ [0, 1].
Fact 3. Both of SF (x) and SE(x) are non-decreasing functions on interval x ∈ [0, 1].
Respecting Fact 3, all the above instances are well defined. Without ambiguity, we may write
F˜i def= SF (Fi) and E˜i def= SE(Ei). In the next section, we will show certain properties of/among
them and the input instance F ≡ F1 ⊎ F2.
3 Empirical Algorithm
In this section, we first present our learning algorithm and formalize our main results (given
respectively in Algorithm 1 and Theorem 1). Afterwards, we probe into the learned Anonymous
Reserve auction via the revenue monotonicity (cf. Fact 2). As a result, the learning problem will
be converted into proving a certain property (parameterized by β = ln(8m/δ)m , where m is the
sample complexity) of the concerning instance F ≡ F1 ⊎ F2.
Algorithm 1 Empirical Algorithm
Input: sample matrix S ≡ (st, j)m×n, where each row (st, j)j∈[n] is a sample drawn from F
Output: an (1− ε)-approximately optimal Anonymous Reserve auction for instance F
1: for all i ∈ {1, 2} do
2: Let ŝi ≡ (̂st, i)t∈[m] be the row-wise i-th highest entries of the sample matrix S
// Namely, reorder rows (st, j)j∈[n] so that st, (1) ≥ · · · ≥ st, (n), then ŝt, i def= st, (i)
3: Let Ei be the i-th highest empirical CDF induced by the i-th highest sample ŝi
4: Let E˜i def= SE(Ei) be the shaded counterpart of the i-th highest empirical CDF Ei
5: end for
6: return the optimal reserve rE˜ for E˜ ≡ E˜1 ⊎ E˜2 (under any tie-breaking rule)
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Theorem 1. With (1− δ) confidence, the reserve rE˜ ∈ R≥0 output by Algorithm 1 gives a nearly
optimal Anonymous Reserve revenue AR(rE˜ , F) ≥ AR(F)− ε, conditioned on
1. m = O(ε−2 · (ln ε−1 + ln δ−1)) and the instance F is supported on [0, 1]n.
Alternatively, AR(rE˜ , F) ≥ (1− ε) · AR(F), conditioned on
2. m = O(ε−2 · H · (ln ε−1 + lnH + ln δ−1)) and the instance F is supported on [1, H]n.
3. m = O(ε−3 · (ln ε−1 + ln δ−1)) and the instance F is regular.
4. m = O(ε−2 · (ln ε−1 + ln δ−1)) and the instance F is MHR.
Analysis via Revenue Monotonicity. The following Lemma 1 suggests that (with high confi-
dence) the empirical instance E ≡ E1 ⊎ E2 is close to the original instance F ≡ F1 ⊎ F2 in the
Kolmogorov distance. We defer the proof of Lemma 1 to Appendix A.2.
Lemma 1. With (1 − δ) confidence, for both i ∈ {1, 2}, the following holds for the i-th highest
CDF Fi and its empirical counterpart Ei: for any value v ∈ R≥0,∣∣Ei(v)−Fi(v)∣∣ ≤ √2β · Fi(v) · (1−Fi(v)) + β.
By construction (E˜i def= SE(Ei) for both i ∈ {1, 2}), the shaded empirical instance E˜ ≡ E˜1 ⊎ E˜2
must be dominated by the empirical instance E ≡ E1 ⊎ E2, thus likely being dominated by the
original instance F ≡ F1 ⊎ F2 as well (in view of Lemma 1).
Instead, let us consider the shaded instance F˜ ≡ F˜1 ⊎ F˜2 derived directly from the original
instance F via the other function SF(·), i.e. F˜i def= SF (Fi) for both i ∈ {1, 2}. Compared to the
earlier function SE(·), the current function SF (·) distorts the input x ∈ [0, 1] to a greater extent:
SF(x) = min
{
1, x+
√
8β · x · (1− x) + 7β}
≥ min{1, x+√2β · x · (1− x) + 4β} = SE(x),
where the inequality is strict when SF (x) < 1. Given these and in view of Lemma 1 (that the
empirical instance E is close to the original instance F), the two shaded instances E˜ and F˜ are
likely to admit the dominance E˜i  F˜i for both i ∈ {1, 2}.
These two propositions are formalized as Lemma 2 (see Appendix A.3 for its proof):
Lemma 2. In the case of Lemma 1, which happens with (1− δ) confidence, for both i ∈ {1, 2},
the following holds for the empirical i-th highest CDF E˜i:
1. E˜i(v) ≥ Fi(v) for all value v ∈ R≥0, i.e. E˜i is dominated by the given i-th highest CDF Fi.
2. E˜i(v) ≤ F˜i(v) for all value v ∈ R≥0, i.e. E˜i dominates the shaded i-th highest CDF F˜i.
Using the reserve rE˜ output by Algorithm 1, the corresponding Anonymous Reserve auction
extracts an expected revenue of AR(rE˜ , F) from the original instance F ≡ F1 ⊎ F2. Below, we
give a lower bound of this revenue, which is more convenient for later analysis.
Lemma 3. In the case of Lemma 1, which happens with (1 − δ) confidence, from the original
instance F ≡ F1 ⊎ F2, the Anonymous Reserve with a reserve of rE˜ generates a revenue better
than the optimal Anonymous Reserve revenue from the shaded instance F˜ ≡ F˜1 ⊎ F˜2:
AR(rE˜ , F) ≥ AR(rF˜ , F˜) ≡ AR(F˜).
Proof. Due to Lemma 2 and Fact 2 (i.e. the revenue monotonicity with respect to Anonymous
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Reserve):
AR(rE˜ , F) ≥ AR(rE˜ , E˜) (Part 1 of Lemma 2: dominance Fi  E˜i)
≥ AR(rF˜ , E˜) (rE˜ is optimal to E˜ but rF˜ may not be)
≥ AR(rF˜ , F˜) ≡ AR(F˜). (Part 2 of Lemma 2: dominance E˜i  F˜i)
This completes the proof of Lemma 3.
Remarkably, the lower-bound revenue AR(F˜) is irrelevant to Algorithm 1, since we directly
construct the shaded instance F˜ ≡ F˜1 ⊎ F˜2 from the original instance F via the function SF (·)
(parameterized by β = ln(8m/δ)m , where m is the promised sample complexity). Based on the
above discussions, Theorem 1 immediately follows if we have
AR(F˜) ≥ AR(F) − ε (the [0, 1]-support setting)
AR(F˜) ≥ (1− ε) · AR(F) (the other three settings)
These two inequalities will be justified in Section 4.
4 Revenue Smoothness
In this section, we will bound the additive or multiplicative revenue gap between the shaded
instance F˜ ≡ F˜1 ⊎ F˜2 and the original instance F ≡ F1 ⊎ F2. First of all, one can easily check
the next Fact 4 via elementary calculations.
Fact 4. The following holds for the parameter β
def
= ln(8m/δ)m :
1. β ≤ ε212 when m ≥ 36ε−2 · (ln ε−1 + ln δ−1 + 3). ([0, 1]-support setting)
2. β ≤ ε2·H−148 when m = 144ε−2 · H · (ln ε−1 + lnH + ln δ−1 + 4). ([1, H]-support setting)
3. β ≤ ε32880 when m ≥ 11520ε−3 · (ln ε−1 + ln δ−1 + 4). (continuous regular setting)
4. β ≤ ε21870 when m ≥ 5610ε−2 · (ln ε−1 + ln δ−1 + 5). (MHR setting)
4.1 [0, 1]-Support Setting
Given the sample complexity m = O(ε−2 · (ln ε−1 + ln δ−1)) promised in Part 1 of Theorem 1,
we safely assume m ≥ 36ε−2 · (ln ε−1 + ln δ−1 + 3). Consider the function SF(·): for x ∈ [0, 1],
SF (x) = min
{
1, x+
√
8β · x · (1− x) + 7β}
≤ x+√8β · x · (1− x) + 7β
≤ x+√2β + 7β (as x · (1− x) ≤ 14)
≤ x+ 1√
6
· ε+ 712 · ε2 (Part 1 of Fact 4: β ≤ ε
2
12)
≤ x+ ε, (as 1√
6
+ 712 ≈ 0.9916 < 1)
which means that F˜i(v) ≤ Fi(v) + ε for all value v ∈ [0, 1] and both i ∈ {1, 2}. Let rF ∈ [0, 1]
denote the optimal reserve for the original instance F = F1 ⊎ F2. Thus,8
AR(F)− AR(F˜) ≤ AR(rF , F)− AR(rF , F˜) (rF may not be optimal for F˜)
8Note that the interval of integration can be safely truncated to the support supremum of su = 1.
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= rF ·
(F˜1(rF )−F1(rF ))+ ∫ 1rF (F˜2(x)−F2(x)) · dx
≤ rF · ε+
∫ 1
rF
ε · dx = ε.
This concludes the proof in the setting with [0, 1]-bounded support.
4.2 [1,H]-Supportetting
Given the sample complexity m = O(ε−2 · H · (ln ε−1 + lnH + ln δ−1)) promised in Part 2 of
Theorem 1, we safely assume m ≥ 144ε−2 · H · (ln ε−1 + lnH + ln δ−1 + 4). To see this amount
of samples is sufficient to learn a nearly optimal Anonymous Reserve, the next two facts will
be useful.
Fact 5. From the original instance F ≡ F1 ⊎ F2, the optimal Anonymous Reserve revenue
AR(F) is at least the support infimum of sl = 1.
Proof. Obvious, e.g. the item always gets sold out under a reserve of 1.
Fact 6. For the original instance F ≡ F1⊎F2, there is an optimal Anonymous Reserve auction
having a reserve of rF ∈
[
1, F−11 (H−1H )
] ⊆ [1, H].
Proof. When there are multiple alternative optimal reserves rF ’s, we would select the smallest
one. Clearly, the bound F−11 (H−1H ) is at least the support infimum of sl = 1 ≤ F−11 (0). Actually,
employing the reserve of 1 guarantees as much revenue as employing another reserve r ∈(F−11 (H−1H ), H]: recall the Anonymous Reserve revenue formula,
AR(1, F)− AR(r, F) = 1 · (1−F1(1)) − r · (1−F1(r))+ ∫ r1 (1−F2(x)) · dx
≥ 1 · (1−F1(1)) − r · (1−F1(r)) (r > F−11 (H−1H ) ≥ 1)
≥ 1 · (1−F1(1)) −H · (1− H−1H ) (r ≤ H & F1(r) > H−1H )
= 1− 1 = 0. (as F1(1) = 0)
That is, under our tie-breaking rule, any reserve r ∈ (F−11 (H−1H ), H] cannot be optimal, which
completes the proof of Fact 5.
Define a parameter B
def
= F2−1(H−1H ) ∈ [1, H]. As shown in the former [0, 1]-support setting,
the function SF (x) ≤ x+
√
8β · x · (1− x) + 7β for x ∈ [0, 1]. We deduce that9
AR(F)− AR(F˜) ≤ AR(rF , F)− AR(rF , F˜) (rF may not be optimal to F˜)
= rF ·
(F˜1(rF )−F1(rF ))+ ∫ HrF (F˜2(x)−F2(x)) · dx
≤ (First Term)+ (Second Term)+ (Third Term)+ 7β ·H, (1)
where
(First Term)
def
= rF ·
√
8β · F1(rF ) ·
(
1−F1(rF )
)
.
(Second Term)
def
=
∫ max{rF , B}
rF
√
8β · F2(x) ·
(
1−F2(x)
) · dx.
(Third Term)
def
=
∫ H
max{rF , B}
√
8β · F2(x) ·
(
1−F2(x)
) · dx.
We measure these terms in the next two lemmas.
Lemma 4. (First Term)+ (Second Term) ≤ √8β · H · AR(rF , F) =
√
8β · H · AR(F).
9Note that the interval of integration can be safely truncated to the support supremum of su = H.
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Proof. Recall Fact 6 that rF ≤ F−11 (H−1H ), which implies F1(rF ) ≤ H−1H and thus F1(rF )1−F1(rF ) ≤
H− 1 ≤ H. Consequently,
(First Term) =
√
8β · F1(rF )1−F1(rF ) · rF ·
(
1−F1(rF )
)
≤ √8β · H · rF ·
(
1−F1(rF )
)
.
Similarly,
√
F2(v) ·
(
1−F2(v)
) ≤ √H · (1−F2(v)) whenever v ≤ B = F2−1(H−1H ). Hence,10
(Second Term) =
∫ max{rF , B}
rF
√
8β · F2(x) ·
(
1−F2(x)
) · dx
≤ √8β · H ·
∫ max{rF , B}
rF
(
1−F2(x)
) · dx
≤ √8β · H ·
∫ H
rF
(
1−F2(x)
) · dx.
Combining the above two inequalities together completes the proof of Lemma 4.
Lemma 5. (Third Term) ≤ √8β · H.
Proof. Clearly, the second-highest CDF F2(v) ≤ 1 for any value v ∈ R≥0. For any value v ≥ B =
F2−1(H−1H ) ∈ [1, H], we have 1−F2(v) ≤ 1H . Accordingly,
(Third Term) =
∫ H
max{rF , B}
√
8β · F2(x) ·
(
1−F2(x)
) · dx
≤
∫ H
max{rF , B}
√
8β/H · dx ≤ H ·
√
8β/H =
√
8β · H.
This completes the proof of Lemma 5.
Applying Lemmas 4 and 5 to inequality (1), we conclude that AR(F˜) ≥ (1− ε) · AR(F):
AR(F) − AR(F˜) ≤ √8β · H · AR(F) +√8β ·H+ 7β · H
≤ (2 · √8β ·H+ 7β · H) · AR(F) (Fact 5: AR(F) ≥ 1)
≤ (
√
6
3 · ε+ 748 · ε2) · AR(F) (Part 2 of Fact 4: β ≥ ε
2·H−1
48 )
≤ ε · AR(F). (as
√
6
3 +
7
48 ≈ 0.9623 < 1)
This completes the proof in the [1, H]-support setting.
4.3 Continuous Regular Setting
Throughout this subsection, we assume that each buyer j ∈ [n] independently draws his value
(for the item) from a continuous regular distribution Fj . Different from the former two settings,
a regular distribution may have an unbounded support, which incurs extra technical challenges
in proving the desired sample complexity of Algorithm 1.
To address this issue, we carefully truncate the given instance F , such that (1) the resulting
instance F∗ is still close to F , under the measurement of the optimal Anonymous Reserve
revenue; (2) F∗ has a small enough support supremum, which allows us to bound the revenue
gap between it and its shaded counterpart F˜∗ (a` la the proofs in the former two settings).
Indeed, (3) F˜∗ is dominated by the shaded instance F˜ (derived directly from F), thus AR(F˜∗) ≤
AR(F). Combining everything together completes the proof in this setting.
10Particularly, even if rF ≥ B, we still have (Second Term) = 0 ≤
√
8β ·H ·
∫ H
rF
(
1− F2(x)
) · dx.
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Auxiliary Lemmas. To elaborate the truncation scheme, let us introduce several useful facts.
Below, Lemma 6might be known in the literature, yet we include a short proof for completeness.
Notably, it only requires the distributions F ≡ {Fj}nj=1 to be independent.
Lemma 6 (Order Statistics of Independent Distributions). For any product instance F ≡
{Fj}nj=1, the following holds for the highest CDF F1 and the second-highest CDF F2: 1−F2(v) ≤(
1−F1(v)
)2
for any value v ∈ R≥0.
Proof. After elementary calculations (e.g. see Jin et al., 2019b, Section 4), one can easily check
that the highest CDF F1(v) =
∏n
j=1 Fj(v) and the second-highest CDF
F2(v) =
∑n
i=1 Pr
{
si ≥ v ∧ (sj < v,∀j 6= i)
}
+Pr{sj < v, ∀j ∈ [n]} (draw {sj}nj=1 from {Fj}ni=1)
= F1(v) ·
[
1 +
∑n
j=1
(
1/Fj(v)− 1
)]
≥ F1(v) ·
[
1 +
∑n
j=1 ln
(
1/Fj(v)
)]
(as z ≥ ln(1 + z) when z ∈ R≥0)
= F1(v) ·
(
1− lnF1(v)
)
(as F1(v) =
∏n
j=1 Fj(v))
≥ F1(v) ·
(
2−F1(v)
)
. (as ln(1− z) ≤ −z when z ∈ [0, 1])
We thus conclude the proof of Lemma 6 by rearranging the above inequality.
We safely scale the original instance F ≡ {Fj}nj=1 so that maxv∈R≥0
{
v · (1 − F1(v))} = 1.
Together with Lemma 6, this normalization leads to the following observations.
Fact 7. AR(F) = maxr∈R≥0
{
r · (1−F1(r))+ ∫ ∞r (1−F2(x)) · dx} ≥ 1.
Fact 8. The highest CDF F1 is stochastically dominated by the equal-revenue CDF Φ1, namely
F1(v) ≥ Φ1(v) def= (1− 1v )+ for any value v ∈ R≥0.
Fact 9. The second-highest CDF F2 is stochastically dominated by the CDF Φ2(v) def= (1 − 1v2 )+,
namely F2(v) ≥ Φ2(v) for any value v ∈ R≥0.
Truncation Scheme. Based on the original instance F ≡ F1 ⊎ F∗2 , we construct the truncated
instance F∗ ≡ F∗1 ⊎ F∗2 as follows: for both i ∈ {1, 2} and any value v ∈ R≥0,
F∗i (v) def=
{
Fi(v) when Fi(v) ≤ 1− (ε/4)i
1 when Fi(v) > 1− (ε/4)i
. (Truncation)
We immediately get two useful facts about the truncated instance F∗ ≡ F∗1 ⊎ F∗2 .
Fact 10. For i ∈ {1, 2}, the truncated i-th highest CDF F∗i is dominated by the original i-th
highest CDF Fi. Thus, the shaded counterpart F˜∗i ≡ SF (F∗i ) is dominated by F˜i ≡ SF (Fi).
Proof. The first dominance F∗i  Fi is obvious (by construction). The second dominance F˜∗i 
F˜i also holds, because SF(·) is a non-decreasing function (see Fact 3).
Fact 11. The truncated instance F∗ ≡ F∗1 ⊎ F∗2 has a support supremum of su ≤ 4/ε.
Proof. As we certified in Lemma 6, for any value v ∈ R≥0, the highest and second-highest CDF’s
satisfy that 1−F2(v) ≤
(
1−F1(v)
)2
. From this one can derive that
F2−1(1− ε2/16) ≤ F1−1(1− ε/4).
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For each i-th highest CDF Fi, we indeed truncate the particular ( ε4)i-fraction of quantiles that
correspond to the largest possible values. In view of the above inequality, the truncated second-
highest CDF F∗2 must have a smaller support supremum than the truncated highest CDF F∗1 .
Due to Fact 8, we further have Φ1(su) ≤ F1(su) ≡ F∗1 (su) ≤ 1− ε/4. That is, 1− 1/su ≤ 1− ε/4
and thus su ≤ 4/ε. This completes the proof of Fact 11.
Revenue Loss. Below, Lemma 7 shows that (Truncation) only incurs a small revenue loss.
Lemma 7 (Revenue Loss). The truncated instance F∗ ≡ F∗1 ⊎ F∗2 satisfies that
AR(F∗) ≥ (1− 34 · ε) · AR(F).
Proof. We adopt a hybrid argument. For brevity, let AR(r, F1⊎F∗2 ) be the resulting Anonymous
Reserve revenue (under any reserve r ∈ R≥0) when only the second-highest CDF is truncated,
and let r be the optimal reserve for the hybrid instance F1 ⊎ F∗2 . The lemma comes from these
two inequalities:
AR(F∗) ≥ (1− ε/4) · AR(F1 ⊎ F∗2 ) (2)
≥ (1− ε/4) · (1− ε/2) · AR(F). (3)
In the remainder of the proof, we verify these two inequalities one by one.
[Inequality (2)]. Under replacing the original highest CDF F1 with F∗1 , we claim that
∃(r ≤ r) : r · (1−F∗1 (r)) ≥ (1− ε/4) · r · (1−F1(r)). (⋆)
The new reserve r ∈ [0, r] may not be optimal for the truncated instance F∗ ≡ F∗1 ⊎ F∗2 . Based
on the revenue formula and assuming inequality (⋆), we can infer inequality (2):
AR(F∗) ≥ AR(r, F∗) = r · (1−F∗1 (r)) + ∫ ∞r (1−F∗2 (x)) · dx
≥ r · (1−F∗1 (r))+ (1− ε/4) · ∫ ∞r (1−F∗2 (x)) · dx (as r ≤ r)
≥ (1− ε/4) · AR(r, F1 ⊎ F∗2 ) (inequality (⋆))
= (1− ε/4) · AR(F1 ⊎ F∗2 ). (r is optimal for F1 ⊎ F∗2)
It remains to verify inequality (⋆). If F1(r) < 1 − ε/4, by construction we have F∗1 (v) = F1(v)
for any value v ≤ r. Clearly, inequality (⋆) holds by employing the same reserve r← r.
From now on, we safely assume F1(r) ≡
∏n
j=1 Fj(r) ≥ 1− ε/4. Inequality (⋆) is enabled by
the next Fact 12, which can be summarized from (Alaei et al., 2015, Section 2).
Fact 12. For any continuous regular distribution Fj and any value r ∈ R≥0, define the parameter
aj
def
= r · (1/Fj(r)− 1). Then, Fj(v) ≤ vv+aj for any value v ∈ [0, r], with the equality holds when
v = r.
Consider another auxiliary highest CDF G∗1(v) def=
∏n
j=1
v
v+aj
. In view of Fact 12, it suffices to
show the following instead of inequality (⋆):
∃(r ≤ r) : r · (1− G∗1(r)) ≥ (1− ε/4) · r · (1−F1(r)), (⋄)
We choose r← G∗−11 (1 − ε/4). Since G∗1(r) = F1(r) ≥ 1− ε/4 (by Fact 12 and our assumption)
and G∗1 is an increasing function, we do have r ≤ r. Let us bound the new reserve r from below:
1− ε/4 = G∗1(r) =
∏n
j=1
r
r+aj
≤ rr+∑nj=1 aj ⇒ r ≥ (4/ε − 1) ·
∑n
j=1 aj .
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Given this, we can accomplish inequality (⋄) as follows:
LHS of (⋄) = r · (ε/4) ≥ (1− ε/4) ·∑nj=1 aj
= (1− ε/4) · r ·∑nj=1 (1/Fj(r)− 1) (by definition of aj)
≥ (1− ε/4) · r ·∑nj=1 (1− Fj(r)) (as CDF Fj(r) ∈ [0, 1])
≥ (1− ε/4) · r · (1−∏nj=1Fj(r)) = RHS of (⋄),
where the last inequality is because
∑
zi ≥ 1−
∏
(1− zi) when zi’s are between [0, 1].
[Inequality (3)]. Since the reserve rF is optimal for the original instance F ≡ F1 ⊎F2 but
may not for the hybrid instance F1 ⊎ F∗2 , we deduce from the revenue formula that
AR(F)− AR(F1 ⊎ F∗2 ) ≤ AR(rF , F1 ⊎ F2)− AR(rF , F1 ⊎ F∗2 )
=
∫ ∞
rF
(F∗2 (x)−F2(x)) · dx.
By construction, 0 ≤ F∗2 (v) − F2(v) ≤ ( ε4)2 for any value v ∈ R≥0. Also, it follows from Fact 9
that F2(v) + 1v2 ≥ 1 ≥ F∗2 (v). Apply both facts to the RHS of the above inequality:
AR(F) − AR(F1 ⊎ F∗2 ) ≤
∫ ∞
0
(F∗2 (x)−F2(x)) · dx (lengthen the interval)
≤
∫ ∞
0
min
{
( ε4 )
2, 1
x2
} · dx
= ε/2 ≤ (ε/2) · AR(F), (Fact 7: AR(F) ≥ 1)
which gives inequality (3) after rearranging. This completes the proof of Lemma 7.
We now prove that, when the sample complexity m ≥ 11520ε−3 · (ln ε−1 + ln δ−1 + 4), the
optimal Anonymous Reserve revenue from the shaded truncated instance F˜∗ ≡ F˜∗1 ⊎ F˜∗2 is
indeed close enough to that from the truncated instance F∗ ≡ F∗1 ⊎ F∗2 .
Lemma 8. The following holds for the shaded truncated instance F˜∗ ≡ F˜∗1 ⊎ F˜∗2 :
AR(F˜∗) ≥ AR(F∗)− ε/4.
Proof. Denote by r∗ the optimal reserve for the truncated instance F∗ ≡ F∗1 ⊎ F∗2 . Clearly, r∗
is at most the support supremum of su ≤ 4/ε (see Fact 11), and may not be optimal for the
shaded truncated instance F˜∗ ≡ F˜∗1 ⊎ F˜∗2 . As illustrated in the former two settings, the function
SF (x) ≤ x+
√
8β · x · (1− x) + 7β for any x ∈ [0, 1]. Given these,11
AR(F∗)− AR(F˜∗) ≤ AR(r∗, F∗)− AR(r∗, F˜∗) (r∗ may not be optimal to F˜∗)
= r∗ · (SF (F∗1 (r∗))−F∗1 (r∗))+ ∫ 4/εr∗ (SF (F∗2 (x))−F∗2 (x)) · dx
≤ (First Term)+ (Second Term)+ 28β · ε−1, (4)
where
(First Term)
def
= r∗ ·
√
8β · F1(r∗) ·
(
1−F1(r∗)
)
.
(Second Term)
def
=
∫ 4/ε
r∗
√
8β · F∗2 (x) ·
(
1−F∗2 (x)
) · dx.
In the reminder of the proof, we quantify these two terms one by one.
11Note that the interval of integration can be safely truncated to the support supremum of su ≤ 4/ε.
15
[First Term]. We infer from Facts 8 and 10 that the truncated highest CDF F∗1 (v) ≥ 1 − 1v for
any value v ∈ R≥0. Additionally, of course F∗1 (v) ≤ 1. We thus have
(First Term) ≤ r∗ ·
√
8β · 1 · [1− (1− 1/r∗)]
=
√
8β · r∗ ≤
√
32β · ε−1. (as r∗ ≤ su ≤ 4/ε)
[Second Term]. Based on Facts 9 and 10, for any value v ∈ R≥0, the truncated second-highest
CDF F∗2 (v) ≥ (1− 1v2 )+. Also, of course F∗2 (v) ≤ 1. For these reasons,
(Second Term) ≤
∫ 4/ε
0
√
8β · (1−F∗2 (x)) · dx (as F∗2 (x) ≤ 1)
≤
∫ 1
0
√
8β · dx +
∫ 4/ε
1
√
8β · 1
x2
· dx (as F∗2 (x) ≥ (1− 1x2 )+)
=
√
8β +
√
8β · ln(4/ε) = √8β · ln(4e/ε)
Plug the above two inequalities into inequality (4):
AR(F∗)− AR(F˜∗) ≤
√
32β
ε +
√
8β · ln(4eε ) + 28βε
≤ ε√
90
+ ε
3/2·ln(4e/ε)√
360
+ 7ε
2
720 (Part 3 of Fact 4: β ≤ ε
3
2880)
≤ ε√
90
+ ln(4e)·ε√
360
+ 7ε
2
720 (
√
ε · ln(4eε ) ≤ ln(4e) for 0 < ε < 1)
≤ ε/4 ( 1√
90
+ ln(4e)√
360
+ 7720 ≈ 0.2409 < 14)
This completes the proof of Lemma 8.
The next Corollary 1 accomplishes the proof in the continuous regular setting.
Corollary 1. When the sample complexity m ≥ 11520ε−3 · (ln ε−1 + ln δ−1 + 4):
AR(F˜) ≥ AR(F˜∗) (Fact 10: dominance F˜i  F˜∗i )
≥ AR(F∗)− ε/4 (Lemma 8: AR(F˜∗) ≥ AR(F∗)− ε/4)
≥ AR(F∗)− (ε/4) · AR(F) (Fact 7: AR(F) ≥ 1)
≥ (1− ε) · AR(F). (Lemma 7: AR(F∗) ≥ (1− 34 · ε) · AR(F))
4.4 MHR Setting
In this subsection, we also assume that the original distributions F ≡ {Fj}nj=1 are independent,
and scale the instance such that maxv∈R≥0
{
v · (1 − F1(v))} = 1. Therefore, Lemma 6 and
Facts 7 to 9 still holds. Nevertheless, the lower-bound formulas in Facts 8 and 9 (for the highest
and second-highest CDF’s) actually have too heavy tails. Namely, sharper formulas are required
to prove the desired revenue gap between the original instance F and its shaded counterpart
F˜ , given the more demanding sample complexity of m = O(ε−2 · (ln ε−1 + ln δ−1)).
Based on the particular structures of the MHR distributions, we will first obtain workable
lower-bound formulas, and then quantify the revenue loss between AR(F˜) and AR(F). To this
end, we safely assume m ≥ 5610ε−2 · (ln ε−1 + ln δ−1 + 5).
Lower-Bound CDF Formulas. Below, Lemma 9 shows that the highest and second-highest
CDF’s of any MHR instance decay exponentially fast.
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Lemma 9. The following holds for any continuous or discrete MHR instance F ≡ {Fj}nj=1:
1. The highest CDF F1(v) ≥ 1− 32 · e−v/6 for any value v ≥ e.
2. The second-highest CDF F2(v) ≥ 1− 94 · e−v/3 for any value v ≥ e.
3. The shaded instance F˜ ≡ F˜1 ⊎ F˜2 has a support supremum of su ≤ 12 ln(21ε ).
Proof. To see Item 1, we fix a parameter u > 1 (to be determined) and present a reduction (from
the original MHR distributions F ≡ {Fj}nj=1 to certain continuous exponential distributions)
such that, for any value v ≥ u, the highest CDF decreases point-wise.
y
v0
Gj(v) = ln
(
1− Fj(v)
)
u
(a) Discrete MHR distribution
y
v0
Gj(v) = ln
(
1− Fj(v)
)
u
(b) Continuous MHR distribution
Figure 2: Demonstration for the reduction in the proof of Lemma 9.
We first handle the discrete MHR instances. As Figure 2(a) illustrates and by definition (see
Section 2.1), such an instance F ≡ {Fj}nj=1 has a discrete support of {k ·∆ | k ∈ N≥1}, where
the step-size ∆ > 0 is fixed. We must have ∆ ≤ 1, because the instance is scaled so that
maxv∈R≥0
{
v · (1−F1(v))} = 1 and ∆ is exactly the support infimum (i.e. F1(∆) = 0).
For any j ∈ [n], let us consider the step function Gj(v) def= ln
(
1 − Fj(v)
)
(marked in blue in
Figure 2(a)) and the piece-wise linear function Lj (marked in gray) induced by the origin (0, 0)
and the “q”-type points
(
k · ∆, Gj(k · ∆)
)
’s (marked in green). Apparently, Gj(v) ≤ Lj(v) for
any value v ∈ R≥0.
The MHR condition holds iff Lj is a concave function (see Section 2.1). Choose u ← k · ∆
(for some k ∈ N≥1 to be determined) and let aj def= − 1u ·Gj(u) > 0, we infer from Figure 2(a):
−aj · v ≥ Lj(v) ≥ Gj(v) = ln
(
1− Fj(v)
) ⇒ Fj(v) ≥ 1− e−aj ·v, (5)
for any value v ≥ u, with all the equalities holding when v = u. Given these, we also have
−aj · u = ln
(
1− Fj(u)
) ≤ ln (1−∏nj=1 Fj(u)) = ln (1−F1(u)), (6)
for each j ∈ [n]. Put everything together: for any value v ≥ u,
lnF1(v) =
∑n
j=1 lnFj(v) (as F1(v) =
∏n
j=1 Fj(v))
(5)≥ ∑nj=1 ln(1− e−aj ·v)
= −∑nj=1∑∞p=1 1p · e−p·aj ·u · e−p·aj ·u·(v/u−1) (Taylor series)
(6)≥ −eln(1−F1(u))·(v/u−1) ·∑nj=1∑∞p=1 1p · e−p·aj ·u (p ≥ 1 and v/u− 1 ≥ 0)
=
(
1−F1(u)
)v/u−1 · ln∏nj=1(1− e−aj ·u) (Taylor series)
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(5)
=
(
1−F1(u)
)v/u−1 · lnF1(u), (equality condition)
from which we deduce that F1(v) ≥
(F1(u))(1−F1(u))v/u−1 for any value v ≥ u = k ·∆. It can be
seen that this lower-bound formula is an increasing function in the term F1(u) ∈ [0, 1].
We would like to choose k ← ⌊e/∆⌋. Because the step-size ∆ ≤ 1, we do have k ∈ N≥1 and
u = k ·∆ ∈ [e − 1, e]. Then, it follows from Fact 8 that F1(u) ≥ F1(e − 1) ≥ 1 − 1e−1 . Replace
the term F1(u) in the above lower-bound formula with this bound:
F1(v) ≥
(
e−2
e−1
)(e−1)1−v/u
= e− ln(
e−1
e−2
)·(e−1)1−v/u
≥ 1− ln(e−1e−2) · (e− 1)1−v/u (as e−z ≥ 1− z)
≥ 1− ln(e−1e−2) · (e− 1)1−v/e (as u ≤ e)
= 1− (e− 1) · ln(e−1e−2 ) · e−
ln(e−1)
e
·v
≥ 1− 32 · e−v/6, (elementary calculations)
for any value v ∈ [u, ∞). Clearly, this inequality holds in the shorter range of v ∈ [e, ∞).
When F ≡ {Fj}nj=1 is a continuous MHR instance, by definition (see Section 2.1) each
function Gj(v) = ln
(
1 − Fj(v)
)
itself is a concave function (as Figure 2(b) illustrates). That is,
we can simply choose u ← e and apply the same arguments as the above. Actually, we can get
a better lower-bound formula that F1(v) ≥ 1− 54 · e−v/e for any value v ≥ e.
Clearly, Item 2 is an implication of Item 1 and Lemma 6. Now, we turn to attesting Item 3.
By definition, the function SF(x) = min
{
1, x+
√
8β · x · (1− x) + 7β} = 1 when x ≥ 1− 7β.
Hence, the shaded instance F˜ ≡ F˜1 ⊎ F˜2 has a support supremum of
su ≤ max{F1−1(1− 7β), F2−1(1− 7β)} (dominance F1  F2)
= F1−1(1− 7β) ≤ 6 ln( 314 · β−1) (Part 1 of Lemma 9)
≤ 6 ln(2805
7ε2
) ≤ 12 ln(21/ε). (Part 4 of Fact 4: β ≤ ε21870)
This completes the proof of Lemma 9.
Revenue Loss. Conceivably, the original instance F ≡ F1 ⊎ F2 should have a small optimal
reserve rF , since F1 and F2 both have light tails. This proposition is formalized as the next
Lemma 10, which will be useful in our later proof.
Lemma 10. For the original MHR instance F = F1 ⊎ F2, there is an optimal Anonymous
Reserve auction having a reserve of rF ≤ C∗, where the constant C∗ ≈ 20.5782 is the larger one
between the two roots of the transcendental equation 32 · z · e−z/6 = 1.
Proof. The proof here is similar in spirit to that of Fact 6. When there are multiple alternative
optimal reserves rF ’s, we would select the smallest one. To see the lemma, we need the math
fact 32 · z · e−z/6 < 1 when z > C∗ ≈ 20.5782. Then, it follows from Part 1 of Lemma 9 that
r · (1−F1(r)) ≤ 32 · r · e−r/6 < 1, (7)
for any reserve r > C∗. Particularly, limr→∞ r ·
(
1−F1(r)
)
= 0. By contrast, we have scaled the
instance such that maxv∈R≥0
{
v · (1 − F1(v))} = 1, which means r · (1 − F1(r)) = 1 for some
other reserve r ∈ [0, C∗]. Recall the Anonymous Reserve revenue formula:
AR(r, F)− AR(r, F) = 1− r · (1−F1(r)) + ∫ rr (1−F2(x)) · dx
≥ 1− r · (1−F1(r)) (7)≥ 0. (as r ≤ C∗ < r)
That is, under our tie-breaking rule, any reserve r > C∗ cannot be revenue-optimal. Apparently,
this observation indicates Lemma 10.
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Finally, Lemma 11 establishes the desired revenue gap between the original instance F ≡
F1 ⊎ F2 and its shaded counterpart F˜ ≡ F˜1 ⊎ F˜2, thus settling the MHR case.
Lemma 11. When the sample complexity m ≥ 5610ε−2 · (ln ε−1 + ln δ−1 + 5):
AR(F˜) ≥ (1− ε) · AR(F).
Proof. Recall that the function SF (x) ≤ x +
√
8β · x · (1− x) + 7β when x ∈ [0, 1]. Based on
the support supremum su ≤ 12 ln(21ε ) established in Part 3 of Lemma 9 and the Anonymous
Reserve revenue formula, we deduce that12
AR(F)− AR(F˜) ≤ AR(rF , F)− AR(rF , F˜) (rF may not be optimal to F˜)
= rF ·
(F˜1(rF )−F1(rF ))+ ∫ 12 ln(21/ε)rF (F˜2(x)−F2(x)) · dx
≤ (First Term)+ (Second Term)+ 84β · ln(21/ε), (8)
where
(First Term)
def
= rF ·
√
8β · F1(rF ) ·
(
1−F1(rF )
)
.
(Second Term)
def
=
∫ ∞
0
√
8β · F2(x) ·
(
1−F2(x)
) · dx.
In the reminder of the proof, we quantify these two terms one by one.
[First Term]. Recall Fact 8 that the highest CDF F1(v) ≥ 1− 1v for any value v ∈ R≥0. Further,
of course F1(v) ≤ 1. Given these and because rF ≤ C∗ ≈ 20.5782 (see Lemma 10),
(First Term) ≤ rF ·
√
8β · 1 · [1− (1− 1/rF )] = √8β · rF ≤ √165β.
[Second Term]. Clearly, F2(v) ∈ [0, 1] for all value v ∈ R≥0. Additionally, we infer from Part 2
of Lemma 9 that
√
1−F2(v) ≤ 32 · e−v/6 when v ≥ e. For these reasons,
(Second Term) ≤
∫ ∞
0
√
8β · (1−F2(x)) · dx (as F2(x) ≤ 1)
≤
∫ e
0
√
8β · dx +
∫ ∞
e
√
8β · 32 · e−x/6 · dx (Part 2 of Lemma 9)
=
√
8β · (e+ 9e−e/6) ≤ √570β (elementary calculations)
Plug the above two inequalities into inequality (8):
AR(F)− AR(F˜) ≤ √165β +√570β + 84β · ln(21/ε)
≤
√
3
34 · ε+
√
57
187 · ε+ 42ε
2·ln(21/ε)
935 (Part 4 of Fact 4: β ≤ ε
2
1870)
≤
√
3
34 · ε+
√
57
187 · ε+ 42 ln 21935 · ε (ε · ln(21ε ) ≤ ln 21 for 0 < ε < 1)
≤ ε ≤ ε · AR(F) (
√
3
34 +
√
57
187 +
42 ln 21
935 ≈ 0.9859 < 1)
where the last inequality is due to Fact 7. This completes the proof of Lemma 11.
12Note that the interval of integration can be safely truncated to the support supremum of su ≤ 12 ln( 21ε ).
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4.5 Continuous λ-Regular Setting
In the literature, there is another distribution family that receives much atten-
tion (Caplin and Nalebuff, 1991; Cole and Roughgarden, 2014; Cole and Rao, 2017;
Allouah and Besbes, 2019) – the continuous λ-regular distributions. When the built-in
parameter λ ranges from 0 to 1, this family smoothly expands from the MHR family to the
regular family.
A` la the MHR case, the sample complexity upper bound is still O(ε−2 · (ln ε−1 + ln δ−1)),
despite that the O(·) notation now hides some absolute constant Cλ depending on λ ∈ (0, 1).
Since the proof of this bound is very similar to the MHR case, we just show in Appendix B a
counterpart extreme value theorem (cf. Lemma 9), but omit the other parts about the revenue
smoothness analysis.
It is noteworthy that the O˜(ε−2) upper bound may not be optimal. Namely, in both of the
continuous λ-regular setting and the continuous MHR setting, the best known lower bounds
are Ω(ε−3/2) (Huang et al., 2018). It would be interesting to pin down the exact sample com-
plexity in both settings, for which the tools developed here and by Cai and Daskalakis (2015);
Huang et al. (2018); Guo et al. (2019) might be useful.
5 Conclusion and Open Problems
In this work, we proved the almost tight sample complexity of the Anonymous Reserve auction,
for each of the [0, 1]n-support, [1, H]n-support, regular and MHR distribution families. In the
literature on “mechanism design via sampling”, a notion complementary to sample complexity
is regret minimization (e.g. see Bar-Yossef et al., 2002; Blum et al., 2003; Blum and Hartline,
2005, and the follow-up papers). Respecting the Anonymous Reserve auction, this means the
seller must select a careful reserve price rt ∈ R≥0 in each round t over a time horizon T ∈ N≥1,
in order to maximize the cumulative revenue, i.e. minimize the cumulative revenue loss against
a certain benchmark.
Indeed, if the seller can access the highest and second-highest bids in all of the past (t− 1)
rounds, our results imply the nearly optimal regret bounds. Consider the [0, 1]-additive setting
for example. Because O(ε−2 · ln ε−1) samples suffice to reduce the revenue loss to ε ∈ (0, 1),
the regret in each round t ∈ [T] is at most O(
√
(ln t)/t). As a result, the cumulative regret is
at most
∑T
t=1O(
√
(ln t)/t) = O(
√
T · lnT). Similarly, the Ω(ε−2) lower bound on the sample
complexity implies an Ω(
√
T) lower bound on the regret.
Cesa-Bianchi et al. (2015) considered the same problem under weaker data access, where
the seller can only observe the allocations and the payments in the past (t − 1) rounds. This
models some particular markets, where the seller is not the auctioneer and can acquire a least
amount of information. Assuming the bids are i.i.d. and supported on [0, 1], Cesa-Bianchi et
al. proved a matching regret of Θ˜(
√
T).13 But, what if the seller still has the weak data access
yet the distributions are distinct and even correlated? The regret of the Anonymous Reserve
auction and other mechanisms in this model is an interesting problem.
Additionally, another natural and meaningful adjusted model is to assume that the bidders
would strategically report their samples, or further, that the bidders themselves are learners as
well. At the time of our paper, this research direction is very nascent yet has already received
much attention. For an overview of this, the reader can turn to Bubeck et al. (2017); Liu et al.
(2018); Hartline and Taggart (2019) and the references therein.
Acknowledgement. We would like to thank Zhiyi Huang, Xi Chen and Rocco Servedio for many
helpful discussions.
13More precisely, their upper bound is O(
√
T · ln ln lnT · ln lnT) and their lower bound is also Ω(
√
T).
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A Missing Proof in Sections 2 and 3
For any technical result and its proof to be presented in this appendix, the reader can find the
counterparts from Guo et al. (2019, Appendix B).
A.1 Proof of Fact 3
Fact 3. The following two functions are both non-decreasing functions on interval x ∈ [0, 1].
• SF(x) = min
{
1, x+
√
8β · x · (1− x) + 7β}
• SE(x) = min
{
1, x+
√
2β · x · (1− x) + 4β}
Proof. For convenience, we only reason about the function SE(·). The same arguments can be
applied to the other function SF (·) as well. It suffices to consider the case that SE(x) < 1, in
which we must have x+
√
2β · x · (1− x) < 1 and thus
√
2β < 1−xx·(1−x) =
√
x−1 − 1
Take the derivative of the function SE :
d
dxSE(x) = 1 +
1
2 ·
√
2β · (√x−1 − 1− 1√
x−1−1
)
≥ 1 + 12 ·
√
2β · (z − 1z)∣∣z=√2β = β + 12 > 0,
where the first inequality is due to the above lower bound for
√
x−1 − 1 and because y = z − 1z
is an increasing function when z > 0. This completes the proof of Fact 3.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 1
Lemma 1 is enabled by Bernstein’s inequality (Bernstein, 1924), which is given in Fact 13.
Fact 13 (Bernstein’s Inequality). Given i.i.d. random variables X1,X2, · · · ,Xt, · · · ,Xm such
that
∣∣Xt −E[Xt]∣∣ ≤ M for some constantM ∈ R≥0, let X def= 1m ·∑mt=1Xt, then:
Pr
[∣∣X −E[Xt]∣∣ > σ] ≤ 2 · exp (− m·σ22·Var[Xt]+ 23 ·M·σ), ∀σ ∈ R≥0.
Lemma 1. With (1 − δ) confidence, for both i ∈ {1, 2}, the following holds for the i-th highest
CDF Fi and its empirical counterpart Ei: for any value v ∈ R≥0,∣∣Ei(v)−Fi(v)∣∣ ≤ √2β · Fi(v) · (1−Fi(v)) + β.
Proof. Let v0
def
= 0 and vm+1
def
= ∞. Denote by v1 ≤ v2 ≤ · · · ≤ vm an re-ordering of the i-th
highest sample ŝi ≡ (̂st, i)t∈[m]. Based on these, we can partition all the non-negative values
v ∈ R≥0 into (m+1) segments14, namely [vt, vt+1) for all t ∈ [0 : m]. Of course, every partition
value v = vt (that t /∈ {0, m+1}) presents exactly one sample entry ŝt, i, at which the empirical
i-th highest CDF Ei has a probability mass of 1m . Thus, for any segment [vt, vt+1) and any value
v ∈ R≥0 belonging to it, we have
0 ≤ Ei(v)− Ei(vt) ≤ Ei(vt+1)− Ei(vt) ≤ 1m ≤ ln(8m/δ)3m = β/3, (9)
where the last inequality holds whenever the sample complexity m ≥ 3 ≥ e38 ≥ e
3
8 · δ.
14A segment [vt, vt+1) would be empty when vt = vt+1. Even so, the proof still works.
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Actually, for every partition value v = vt that t ∈ [0 : m + 1], we can establish a stronger
concentration inequality: let a
def
=
√
Fi(v) ·
(
1−Fi(v)
)
and b
def
=
√
2β · a+ 2β3 , then
Pr
[∣∣Ei(v)−Fi(v)∣∣ > b] ≤ δ4m ≤ δ2·(m+1) . (10)
To see so, let us probe the i.i.d. Bernoulli random variable Xt
def
= 1
{̂
st, i ≤ v
}
for each t ∈ [m].
One can easily check that 1m ·
∑m
t=1Xt = Ei(v) and E[Xt] = Fi(v). Hence, we invoke Bernstein’s
inequality, with the parameters σ = m · b, Var[Xt] = a2 and M = 1:
Pr
[∣∣Ei(v)−Fi(v)∣∣ > b] ≤ 2 · exp (− m·b22·a2+ 2
3
·b
)
.
Since β = ln(8m/δ)m and b =
√
2β · a+ 2β3 , we infer inequality (10) as follows:
2 · exp (− m·b2
2·a2+ 2
3
·b
) ≤ δ4m ⇔ b2 − 2β3 · b− 2β · a2 ≥ 0
⇐ LHS = a3 · (8β)3/2 ≥ 0,
Due to inequality (10) and the union bound (over all partition value v = vt that t ∈ [0 : m+1]),
with at least (1− δ/2) confidence, we have∣∣Ei(vt)−Fi(vt)∣∣ ≤ b, ∀t ∈ [0 : m+ 1]. (11)
From now on, we safely assume inequality (11). In that any value v ∈ R≥0 belongs to a unique
segment [vt, vt+1) that t ∈ [0 : m],
Fi(v) ≥ Fi(vt)
(11)≥ Ei(vt)− b
(9)≥ Ei(v)− (b+ β/3)
Fi(v) ≤ Fi(vt+1)
(11)≤ Ei(vt+1) + b
(9)≤ Ei(v) + (b+ β/3)
That is, |Ei(v)−Fi(v)| ≤ b+ β/3 =
√
2β · a+ β. With at least (1− δ) confidence, this inequality
holds for both i ∈ {1, 2} (by the union bound). This completes Lemma 1.
A.3 Proof of Lemma 2
Lemma 2. In the case of Lemma 1, which happens with (1− δ) confidence, for both i ∈ {1, 2},
the following holds for the empirical i-th highest CDF E˜i:
1. E˜i(v) ≥ Fi(v) for all value v ∈ R≥0, i.e. E˜i is dominated by the given i-th highest CDF Fi.
2. E˜i(v) ≤ F˜i(v) for all value v ∈ R≥0, i.e. E˜i dominates the shaded i-th highest CDF F˜i.
Proof. Note that β = ln(8m/δ)m ≪ 1. For brevity, here we write Ei = Ei(v), E˜i = E˜i(v), Fi = Fi(v)
and F˜i = F˜i(v). We justify Lemma 2 conditioned on the inequality in Lemma 1:∣∣E − F∣∣ ≤ √2β · F · (1−F) + β.
[Item 1: E˜i ≡ SE(Ei) ≥ Fi for all v ∈ R≥0]. Since SE(·) is a non-decreasing function (Part 1 of
Fact 3), it suffices to handle the case that the inequality in Lemma 1 is an equality:
Ei = max
{
0, Fi −
√
2β · Fi · (1−Fi)− β
}
. (12)
[When Ei = 0]. We have E˜i ≡ SE(Ei) ≡ SE(0) = 4β and Fi −
√
2β · Fi · (1−Fi) − β
(12)≤ 0, or
equivalently, √
2β · (1/Fi − 1) + β/Fi ≥ 1. (13)
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Obviously, the LHS of inequality (13) is a decreasing function in Fi ∈ [0, 1]. On the opposite of
the lemma, assuming that Fi > E˜i = 4β, we then have
LHS of (13) ≤
√
2β · [(4β)−1 − 1]+ β · (4β)−1 <√1/2 + 1/4 ≈ 0.9571 < 1,
which contradicts inequality (13). Accordingly, E˜i ≥ Fi when Ei = 0.
[When Ei > 0]. We have Ei (12)= Fi −
√
2β · Fi · (1−Fi)− β. Rearranging this inequality leads
to 2β · Fi · (1−Fi) = (Fi − Ei − β)2, or equivalently,
(1 + 2β) · F2i − 2 · (Ei + 2β) · Fi + (Ei + β)2 = 0.
By solving this quadratic equation (i.e. select the larger one between the two roots) and taking
into account the fact that Fi ≤ 1, we have
Fi ≤ min
{
1, (1 + 2β)−1
✿✿✿✿✿✿✿✿✿✿
· [Ei + 2β +√(Ei + 2β)2 − (1 + 2β) · (Ei + β)2]}
(drop (1 + 2β)−1 term and rearrange other terms)
≤ min{1, Ei + 2β +√2β · Ei · (1− Ei) + 3β2 − (2β3 + 4β2 · Ei)}
(since z1 + z2 − z3 ≤ (√z1 +√z2)2 when zi ≥ 0)
≤ min{1, Ei + 2β
✿✿
+
√
2β · Ei · (1− Ei) +
√
3β2
✿✿✿✿✿
}
(since 2 +
√
3 < 4)
≤ min{1, Ei +√2β · Ei · (1− Ei) + 4β
✿✿
}
= SE(Ei) = E˜i.
Thus, E˜i ≥ Fi when Ei > 0. Putting both cases together completes the proof of Item 1.
[Item 2: E˜i = SE(Ei) ≤ SF (Fi) = F˜i for all v ∈ R≥0]. Recall Fact 3: SE(·) is a non-decreasing
function. It suffices to deal with the case that the inequality in Lemma 1 is an equality, namely
Ei = min
{
1, Fi +
√
2β · Fi · (1−Fi) + β
}
. (14)
[When Ei = 1]. It follows that Fi +
√
2β · Fi · (1−Fi) + β
(14)≥ 1 and thus
F˜i = SF (Fi) = min
{
1, Fi +
√
8β · Fi · (1−Fi) + 7β
}
≥ min{1, Fi +√2β · Fi · (1−Fi) + β} = 1 ≥ E˜i.
[When Ei < 1]. It follows that Ei (14)= Fi +
√
2β · Fi · (1−Fi) + β and thus
Ei · (1− Ei) = Fi · (1−Fi) +
[√
2β · Fi · (1−Fi) + β
] · (1− 2 · Fi)
− [√2β · Fi · (1−Fi) + β]2
≤ Fi · (1−Fi) +
√
2β · Fi · (1−Fi) + β
≤ [√Fi · (1−Fi) +√β]2. (15)
Combining everything together leads to
Ei +
√
2β · Ei · (1− Ei) + 4β
(15)≤ Ei +
√
2β · Fi · (1−Fi) + (
√
2 + 4) · β
= Fi + 2 ·
√
2β · Fi · (1−Fi) + (
√
2 + 5) · β
≤ Fi +
√
8β · Fi · (1−Fi) + 7β. (16)
So, E˜i = min{1, LHS of (16)} ≤ min{1, RHS of (16)} = F˜i. We thus conclude Item 2.
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B Continuous λ-Regular Setting
This appendix sketches out how to establish the O(ε−2 · (ln ε−1 + ln δ−1)) sample complexity
upper bound of Algorithm 1 in the λ-regular setting. By standard notion, for a certain 0 < λ < 1,
a continuous distribution Fj is λ-regular when Hj(v)
def
=
(
1 − Fj(v)
)−λ
is a convex function on
its support v ∈ supp(Fj). Similar to the regular case and the MHR case, we assume the
distributions F ≡ {Fj}nj=1 to be independent, and scale the instance so that maxv∈R≥0
{
v · (1−
F1(v)
)}
= 1. Thus, Lemma 6 and Facts 7 to 9 still holds. From the λ-regularity, we can derive
the next Lemma 12.
Lemma 12. The following holds for any continuous λ-regular instance F ≡ {Fj}nj=1: given any
value u > 1, the highest CDF F1(v) ≥ 1− (uv )1/λ · ln( uu−1 ) for any larger value v ≥ u.
That is, the highest CDF F1 must have a superlinearly-decay tail (uv )1/λ · ln( uu−1) = O(v−1/λ).
Although heavier than the exponentially-decay tail in the MHR case, this still suffices to prove
a sample complexity upper bound of O(Cλ · ε−2 · (ln ε−1 + ln δ−1)), where Cλ is some absolute
constant given by λ ∈ (0, 1).
To achieve so, we shall select a careful anchoring point u > 1 in Lemma 12 and adopt the
almost same arguments as in the MHR case (recall Lemmas 9 to 11). When λ→ 1, the built-in
constant Cλ can be arbitrarily large – since the λ-regular family finally expands to the regular
family, Part 3 of Theorem 1 declares a truly greater sample complexity of Θ˜(ε−3).
y
v0
Hj(v) =
(
1− Fj(v)
)
−λ
u
Figure 3: Demonstration for the reduction in the proof of Lemma 12.
Proof. We first apply a reduction to the distributions F ≡ {Fj}nj=1 such that, compared to the
original highest CDF F1, the resulting highest CDF decreases point-wise for any value v ≥ u.
The reduction is illustrated in the following Figure 3. Since Hj(v) =
(
1− Fj(v)
)−λ
is a convex
function, define bj
def
= 1u ·Hj(u) > 0, then
bj · v ≤ Hj(v) =
(
1− Fj(v)
)−λ ⇒ Fj(v) ≥ 1− (bj · v)−1/λ, (17)
for any value v ≥ u, with all the equalities hold when v = u. For these reasons, we have
lnF1(v) =
∑n
j=1 ln Fj(v) (as F1(v) =
∏n
j=1 Fj(v))
(17)≥ ∑nj=1 ln [1− (bj · v)−1/λ]
= −∑nj=1∑∞p=1 1p · (bj · u)−p/λ · (vu)−p/λ (Taylor series)
≥ −(vu)−1/λ ·
∑n
j=1
∑∞
p=1
1
p · (bj · u)−p/λ (p ≥ 1 and (vu) ≥ 1)
= (uv )
1/λ · ln∏nj=1 [1− (bj · v)−1/λ] (Taylor series)
(17)
= (uv )
1/λ · lnF1(u) (equality condition holds)
≥ (uv )1/λ · ln
(
1− 1u
)
. (Fact 8: F1(u) ≥ 1− 1u)
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After being rearranged, this inequality becomes
F1(v) ≥ e−(
u
v
)1/λ·ln( u
u−1
) ≥ 1− (uv )1/λ · ln( uu−1 ),
where the last inequality is because e−z ≥ 1− z. This completes the proof of Lemma 12.
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